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Jurnal Ilmu-Ilmu Ushuluddin

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Relevance to the World Economic and
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**The Study of Living Hadith of the Ancak
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Umi Hanik, Ibnu Hajar Ansori

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Islamist Ideology and Its Effect on the Global Conflict: Comparative Study between Hamas and ISIS

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Abstract

This paper aims to explain that the spread of the ideology of Islamism in the Middle East in recent decades has led to conflict, both intra and inter-religion that continues until today. From these Islamist groups, Hamas Movement and ISIS provided significant effects of the conflict are. This study is qualitative research. Conflict Theory of John Spanier (hight-politic conflict) used to analyze how the two groups model of ideological construction influenced the political and economic stability as well as conflict in the Middle East and the Islamic world. Based on the observations of these two groups, it can be found that theologically, Hamas adheres to religious doctrines which prompted him to undertake armed resistance against Israel. At the same time, ISIS is a militant group that is strongly influenced by religious doctrine. However, from the aspect of rigidity doctrine and strategy of the movement, both groups are much different. ISIS is an ultra-radical group hostile to all other communities and brutally attacked the community of which he considered infidels. While Hamas has a more soft ideology and commit acts of violence in the context of resistance against Israeli colonialism.

Keyword: *Hamas, ISIS, Politic, Islamism, Global Conflict*

A. Introduction

In the latest constellation of Middle East conflict, after Arab Spring and until today, it can be found there are three civil wars raging in the region; First, the internal civil war within Islam between the Sunni radical Jihadist and Sunni Muslim regime; Secondly, the civil war in the entire region between Sunni Muslims funded by Saudi Arabia with Shiite funded by Iran; Thirdly, the civil war between Sunni Jihadis in Iraq and all other minorities in the region- Yazidis, Turkmen, Kurds, Christians, Jews and Alawites. Various civil wars have become a fertile breeding ground for ISIS and other militant Islamist groups. In addition to the civil wars the Israeli-Palestinian war involving Hamas¹ also is still happening.

The emergence of Islamic groups who are struggling to replace the regimes in power in recent years, believed to be the main source of future conflicts in the Middle East. The Islamist groups are groups that have ideological construction that legitimizes acts of violence with religious texts, or use the instrument of jihad to impose religious and political views on social entity.² They build an ideal of formal institutionalization of Islam in an Islamic regime. The views are forcing the Islamists to be struggling with the regime that is not willing to his power degraded, resulting in a prolonged conflict.³

Interestingly, Islamist groups, that is particularly military seeked can develop quickly

¹ Hamas is an acronym of *Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyyah* (Islamic Resistance Movement), founded by Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, Aziz Rantisi and others in 1987 in Palestine. This movement uses Islam as the basis to the struggle for Palestine. In 2006, this group turned into a powerful political faction in Palestine which opposed Fatah. Currently, the group still has strong support from the Palestinian people and believed to play an important role in the fight against Israel.

² Ian O. Lesser, Bruce R. Nardulli, Lori A. Arghavan, "Sources of Conflict in the Great Middle East," (2010): 19.

³ This issue discussed by John L. Esposito, *The Islamic Threat, Myth of Reality* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 23.

and can degrade the structure of government that has a political and military powerful. In Egypt, is known that the Mubarak regime has a political structure that is very strong and robust military infrastructure so it can in power more than 30 years. In Iraq and Syria, the regime is dominated by the Shiite network is so strong, but so overwhelmed when dealing with rebel groups who do not have political structures and weaponry infrastructure. In Palestine, the regime of Fatah must accept the harsh reality after he was defeated by Hamas in the political and military battles.

In this context, it can be identified that Hamas and ISIS⁴ are two of the most influential Islamist group in the constellation of conflict in the Middle East and even the world as a whole. Before the establishment of ISIS, armed conflict is most common in the Gaza Strip involving the military wing of Hamas (Izzuddin al-Qassam) and the Israeli military. In the last decade, the conflict in the region is the most likely to cause material losses and victims of humanity. The response from the various elements toward the conflict was still continuous to emerge especially from leaders of countries in the world. After the founding of ISIS officially in 2013, the international outlook, especially observers and international media focused on the raging conflict and greater than political and military conflicts that occurred in the Gaza Strip. The reason is, the conflict in the Gaza Strip is still in the clear map between Israel who wants to employ under the Palestinian territories and Hamas who want to maintain a presence in a Palestinian state. While in Iraq and Syria who

⁴ ISIS is the acronym for the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (*al-Daulah al-Islamiyyah bi al-Iraq wa al-Sham*), often called ISIL. Islamic State of Iraq was proclaimed by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in 2013. Basically, this radical organization founded by the leaders of al-Qaeda who are fighting against the Shi'ite regime in Iraq. This history has been much studied by experts among them Najih Ibrahim and Hisyam al-Najjar, *al-Daulah al-Islamiyyah bi al-Iraq wa al-Syam: al-Sikkīn allazī Tazbah al-Islām* (Kairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 2014).

became the battleground of ISIS, the map of conflict is extremely complex because it involves many parties and interests; ISIS, al-Qaeda, Iraq regime, the Syrian regime, rebel group, the Alliance of Shiite, Kurdish and other outsider interests.

Comparing Hamas with the ISIS also interesting from an ideological standpoint, because both have roots back to the Salafi Jihadist ideology that is constructed by Sayyid Qutb and Mawdudi. Although the further development these two groups have many difference due to the views and strategies developed by its leaders. In essence, is almost all observers agreed to that the ISIS group is much more extreme than Hamas even though they both adopted the military track. Hamas does not consider all of that does not support it as an enemy, while ISIS confronted all who do not want to join the group. So then ISIS is regarded as the most dangerous terrorist group ever.

In addition the Islamic State is not only a terrorist group. It is a political and military organization that holds a radical interpretation of Islam as a political philosophy and seeks to impose that worldview by force on Muslims and non-Muslims alike. Expelled from Al-Qaeda for being too extreme, the Islamic State claims to be the legitimate ruler of all Sunni Muslims worldwide. They have established what they regard as a state which includes large swaths of territory in Syria and Iraq, governed from Raqqa in Syria.

Although ISIS is an extension of the global jihadist movement in its ideology and worldview, its social origins are rooted in a specific Iraqi context, and, to a lesser extent, in the Syrian war that has raged for almost four years. While al-Qaeda's central organization emerged from an alliance between ultraconservative Saudi Salafism and radical Egyptian Islamism, ISIS was born of an unholy union between an Iraq-

based al-Qaeda offshoot and the defeated Iraqi Baathist regime of Saddam Hussein, which has proved a lethal combination.⁵

In this paper, there are three focus will be compared between Hamas and ISIS; (1) ideological construction, (2), strategy of struggle, (3), its impact on global conflict.

A. Theoretical Framework of Islamism and Conflict

Conflict according to Joice L. Hocker is a symptom that basically cannot be separated from human daily life, in other words humans from the beginning were already familiar with conflict and strife. The dispute is basically caused by a difference and misunderstanding. However, conflict in this sense is not the focus of the study because it is general and interpersonal. The focus of this study is violent conflicts caused by an ideological construction, both in the form of religious ideology and political ideology, as in the views of Huntington, Tariq Ali, Hasan Hanafi, Khaled Abou al-Fadl, Abd al-Wahab Masiri, Bassam Tibi and others.

The discourse on conflict in this study will focus on conflict, as Neil A. Levine states that conflict is an inherent and recognized part of its existence in social and political life. In many places, conflicts due to ideological differences usually lead to violence, and this must be paid handsomely with the possibility of loss of human life. Conflicts can also degrade the government, cause chaos in the country and destroy people's livelihoods. The consequence of a nation's failure to resolve violent conflicts is a prolonged crisis. Violent conflict will dramatically disrupt traditional development and can spread to various aspects, reducing growth and prosperity throughout the region.⁶

⁵ Fawaz A. Gerges, "ISIS and the Third Wave of Jihadism", 339. http://currenthistory.com/Gerges_Current_History.pdf. Accessed 5 July 2015.

⁶ Mengenai konflik agama dan ideologi dan resolusi konflik, lihat Marc Gopin, "Religion, Violence, and Conflict Resolution, dalam *Peace and Change* Vol. 22 No. 1 (Januari

According to John Spanier, in an international context, conflicts can be classified in several forms. Among them are conflicts in the realm of high-politics. This form of conflict basically occurs related to several issues such as security, ideology and politics. Conflicts such as this show the symptom of cross-country competition among countries that are of global, regional, national and sub-national political sovereignty competition. In such conflicts there is a tendency that competition will result in the player who wins the absolute and vice versa absolutely nothing to lose. As an example of this conflict is the problem of Afghanistan, Palestine and the Syrian conflict which makes the Islamists as the main actors.

B. Ideological Construction of Hamas and ISIS: Between Fundamentalism and "Takfirism"

1. Hamas Fundamentalism

Hamas ideological concept can not be separated from the influence of the theological concept of religious and socio-political conditions in which the group is growing. The source that can be used as a reference in tracing thought Hamas is the documents that have been produced since the organization was established. The document that is very authoritative in explaining the ideology of Hamas -as mentioned before- is Charter produced by the leaders of Hamas at the time of its founding in 1988, the document known as *Mithaq Hamas*⁷ or Hamas Charter in 1988.⁸

Ideological views Hamas as contained in the present Charter is the assertion that Islam is a system that underlies all aspects of life including

19997), 1-31.

⁷ As Said by Musa Abu Marzuq, official spokesman of Hamas Movement, Hamas Charter in still main reference to the group, both in the politic and religious life. Interview with Musa Abu Marzuq, Cairo 10 January 2015.

⁸ Many researcher and scholar derived his study to the movement from the Hamas Charter. See for example, Azzam Tamimi, *Hamas Unwritten Chapter* (London: C Hurst & Co Publisher, 2006).

politics.⁹ In the theory of Islamic thought, the view Hamas is known as a holistic view of Islam because Islamic tradition serve as the fundamental ideology in the social and political life. Some of the ideological issues are clearly discussed in this charter including the assertion that Hamas adopts the doctrine of the Muslim Brotherhood movement in Egypt. Concerning Palestinian state, Hamas considers the land of Palestine as Islamic waqf land and inch of the land should not be given to other nations and religions, including Jews. In response to the Israeli Palestinian conflict, Hamas believes that jihad with the military track is the only way in the liberating Palestine. Hamas does not believe in diplomacy in the struggle for Palestine. This understanding was a mindset of Hamas in its early phase.¹⁰

As the influence of Islamic a holistic view of the above in Article 3 of the Charter of Hamas explained that Islam is a method to regulate human life, both in the political sphere as well as in the social and economic sphere. Furthermore, in the hierarchical organization Hamas movement which established in December 1987, an extension of the Muslim Brotherhood which was developed by the figures above. When explored further the two movements not only structurally related, moreover, objectives, principles and their ideology is very closely linked. The related ideas also can be seen from the statement that the Hamas movement is an

⁹ Hamas was inherited the doctrine of Muslim Brotherhood which encourage to the establishment of Islamic State to implement Islamic law and tradition in the state institution. See, Mulawarman Hannase, *Islamisme dan Konflik: Perspektif Teologis dan Politis Pemikiran dan Pergerakan Hamas* (Jakarta: Bolabatu Jaya & PSATT, 2015), 168-170.

¹⁰ Concerning ideological doctrine of Hamas, its explanation can be seen in the study of Ziad Abu Amr, *Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza: Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Jihad*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994). Azzam Tamimi, *Hamas, Unwritten Chapter*. Loren D. Lybarger, *Identity and Religion in Palestine: The Struggle between Islamism and Secularism in the Occupied Territories* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2007).

episode of a few episodes of the struggle of the Brotherhood, especially in the fight against the Zionists.¹¹

Jeroen Gunning, an expert on the ideology of Hamas viewed Hamas as a movement that makes Islam as a framework and political program, and the resources that are considered authoritative in regulating the state constitution must come from Islam.¹² He says that by examining the basic principles of Hamas movement beliefs, it will be found a lot of quote verses of the Koran and Hadith and religious symbols. According to Gunning who studied the ideology of Hamas, the number of citations of the religious texts indicate that Hamas has a doctrine based on Islamic ideology is very strong. It was also pointed out that many religious teachings serve as the methodology of the life of Hamas in the social, political and economists.

In addition to the doctrine of the Islamic state, Hamas also adheres to the doctrine of Palestine sacrality. For him, the land of Palestine is essential for Muslims and may not be given to other communities. This distinguishes the view of Fatah and Hamas, which Hamas does not want peace talks with Israel because it considers the doctrine of the sanctity of Palestine derived from religious texts.¹³ The doctrine of the sanctity of Palestine is also associated with antisemitism doctrine espoused by Hamas.

Based on the assessment of the construction of the ideology of Hamas, it could be justified the assumption that this movement is a fundamentalist group that is heavily involved in the conflict. It can be seen how strong religious doctrine in the ideology of Hamas which was adopted from the previous figures of the political Islam.¹⁴ In addition, Hamas also seeks

to provide responses to the social and political problems faced since the outbreak of the first intifada. In many ways, Hamas provides clear attitude and stance how to deal with Israel, how its role in the Palestinian political arena and how to contribute to the Palestinian in the field of education, economic and religious. All doctrines are built and then try to implement in the concept of jihad obligations.¹⁵ Thus, scholars who study the ideology of Hamas as outlined above, Nusse, Gunning and Tamimi assume that Hamas is a fundamentalist Islamic movements involved in the Palestinian conflict due to the influence of religious doctrine which very strong.

2. ISIS "Takfirism"

In contrast to Hamas, ISIS is an ultra-radical group that emerged in Iraq in early 2013. The group considers infidels (kafir) all which do not join the group, regarded as infidels all which do not want to support the concept of an Islamic state and does not want to pledge allegiance to the caliph which they appoint. Any person who does not pledge allegiance to ISIS and its leaders should be killed. ISIS also forbids democracy, elections, and the election of the President. They hostile to all leaders who are not applying the law of God -based understanding of them hating nationalists, Islamist groups which not of their group and forbid all state institutions. That's some ideological concepts constructed by ISIS.¹⁶

ISIS essentially was organization born from a group of al-Qaeda. Just as al-Qaeda, ISIS is

Tashaddud 'Aqa'idi wa Murunah Siyaasiyyah", *Silsilah Tarjamat al-Zaitunah* Vol. 47, (Januari 2010): 4.

¹⁵ The resistance Ideology constructed by Hamas is a form of jihad doctrine that is understood by this group. Basically, the doctrine of jihad is understood by the Islamist groups in the modern age are more likely to be physically and militancy, thereby this understanding has been resulting in conflict. Mulawarman Hannase, *Islamisme dan Konflik*, 185.

¹⁶ See detail in Najih Ibrahim and Hisyam al-Najjar, *al-Daulah al-Islamiyyah bi al-Iraq wa al-Syam: al-Sikkin allazi Tazbah al-Islam* (Kairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 2014).

¹¹ See in the Hamas Charter, Article 2.

¹² Jeroen Gunning, *Hamas ini Politic; Democracy, Religion and Violent* (London: Hurst Company, 2007), 167.

¹³ Hamas Doctrine says that Palestine an Islamic *waqf*, it derived from al-Qur'an, QS. Al-Israa: 1.

¹⁴ Osama Abu Rashid and Paul Syam, "Hamas:

an Islamic group that embraces the ideology of “takfir”. However, ISIS is more radical when it considers all other entities as infidels and must be eliminated. The group of al-Qaeda itself has ideological roots from “salafi jihadis” and “salafi Wahhabism”. As claimed by Bernard Haykel from Princeton University that ISIS is the manifestation of Wahhabism ideology.¹⁷

The Islamic State’s (ISIS) adopted severe version of Jihadi Salafism is attributable to Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi¹⁸, the founder of al-Qaeda in Iraq who studied theology with the prominent jihadi scholar Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi¹⁹. The first leaders of the Islamic State, Abu Umar al-Baghdadi²⁰ and Abu Hamza al-Muhajir²¹, were likewise Jihadi-Salafi stalwarts. Their speeches drew extensively on established Salafi

authorities, many of them from the Wahhabi tradition.

The ideology of ISIS is that of Salafist-jihadism. It is important to remember that for them there is no distinction between religion and state. All decisions are based on a hardline interpretation of sharia (Islamic law), which is brutally enforced in the areas controlled by the Islamic State.²² It is also called as an Islamic holistic ideology derived from the religious texts.

In spite from the influence of Wahhabi and Salafi jihadist doctrine, ISIS has a number of more extreme doctrines. The most prominent of these stipulate: all Muslims must associate exclusively with fellow “true” Muslims and dissociate from anyone not fitting this narrow definition; failure to rule in accordance with God’s law constitutes unbelief; fighting the Islamic State is tantamount to apostasy; all Shi’a Muslims are apostates deserving of death; and the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas are traitors against Islam, among many other things. Importantly, the Islamic State anchors these concepts in traditional Salafi literature, and is more dogmatic about their application than al-Qaeda.²³

It should be noted that although the al-Qaeda and ISIS embrace the same ideological doctrine, but differ in the strategy of Jihad. Al-Qaeda still adhered to “defensive jihad” while ISIS embraced “offensive jihad”. Said by Fawaz A. Gerges, “offensive Jihad” carried by ISIS is a “total war” a war without knowing konpromi. It disdains arbitration or compromise, even with Sunni Islamist rivals. Unlike al-Qaeda Central, it does not rely on theology to justify its actions. “The only law I subscribe to is the law of the jungle,” retorted Baghdadi’s

¹⁷ Jim Eckman, “Understanding ISIS: Its Origins, Its Ideology and Its Context”, in <https://graceuniversity.edu/iip/2014/10/understanding-isis-its-origins-its-ideology-and-its-context/>. Accessed 5 July 2015.

¹⁸ Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq from 2004 to 2006. He is ‘*Aḥmad Faḍīl an-Nazāl al-Ḥalāyila*) was a militant Islamist from Jordan who ran a pramilitary training camp in Afghanistan. He became known after going to Iraq and being responsible for a series of bombings, beheadings, and attacks during the Iraq War.

¹⁹ Abu Muhammad Aasim al-Maqdisi is the assumed name of Aasim Muhammad Tahir al-Barqawi, a Salafi jihadi Islamist Jordanian-Palestinian writer. He is best known as the spiritual mentor of Jordanian mujahid Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the initial leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq. However, an ideological and methodical split emerged between Maqdisi and Zarqawi in 2004 due to Zarqawi’s takfeer proclamations towards the Shi’a populations in Iraq. Maqdisi opted for a more cautious approach towards targeted Shi’a killings, attempting to stop Zarqawi’s radical ideological movement before Zarqawi’s methods become counter-productive.

²⁰ Abu Omar al-Baghdadi most commonly known as Abu Abdullah al-Rashid al-Baghdadi Leader of the Islamic State of Iraq and Mujahideen Shura Council to 2010. Very little is known about al-Baghdadi. It is stated that he may have served with the former Iraqi army as an officer during the Ba’athist regime of Saddam Hussein.

²¹ His name Abu Ayyub al-Masri leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq from 2006 to 2010, born in Egypt, he joined the Muslim Brotherhood and, according to General Caldwell, joined Ayman al-Zawahiri’s Egyptian Islamic Jihad in 1982, where he “worked with Zawahiri.” Al-Masri went to bin Laden’s al-Farouk camp in Afghanistan in 1999, where he became an expert with explosives, especially truck bombs and roadside bombs like those currently used in Iraq.

²² Elliot Friedland, “The Islamic State”, *The Clarion Project: Challenging Extremism Promoting Dialogue*, (May 2015), 13.

²³ Cole Bunzel, “From Paper State to Caliphate: The Ideology of the Islamic State”, 10.

second-incommand and right-hand man, Abu Muhammed The weakest link of ISIS as a social movement is its poverty of ideas. ISIS and the Third Wave of Jihadism al-Adnani, to a request more than a year ago by rival militant Islamists in Syria who called for ISIS to submit to a Sharia court so that a dispute with other factions could be properly adjudicated. For the top ideologues of Salafi jihadism, such statements and actions are sacrilegious, "smearing the reputation" of the global jihadist movement, in the words of Abu Mohammed al-Maqdisi, a Jordan-based mentor to Zarqawi and many jihadists worldwide.²⁴

C. Hamas and ISIS Movement Strategy

1. Politic and the Military Wing

Talking about the strategy of struggle adopted by the Hamas movement, there are two phases of the development of these groups closely related to the strategies and patterns of movement. The first phase is the ideological phase began in the early days of its appearance until 2006. At this stage, Hamas adhere to religious doctrines inherited from its leaders and more involved in humanitarian activities in the Gaza Strip. During this period, Hamas avoid political channels in his strategy.

On this development, Hamas rejects all forms of political project to solve the Palestinian issue, especially political projects that benefit the Israelis, both in the temporary or long-term interests. For Hamas, to unite the Palestinians is the first step to further undertake the struggle with the mechanism of jihad in order to liberate the land of Palestine as a whole. Hamas rejects any form of dialogue with Israel that considered lead to the recognition of the existence of the State of Israel. Hamas does not want intolerant of the slightest Palestinian land to be given to Israel, so Hamas firmly reject all forms of

cooperation and the interaction with Israel.²⁵ While in addressing Palestinian politics, Hamas also refused to engage in practical politics because it does not provide much benefit to the liberation of Palestine.

The second phase of the development of Hamas was from 2006 until today when Hamas transformed into the path of practical politics after winning the election. Hamas decided to participate in the election of 2006 was a monumental decision and shows the changes in the various aspects of Hamas, particularly in political life. Hamas participation drastically changed the political configuration of Palestine at that time. In such participation, Hamas won the election by winning 74 of 132 seats, while Fatah only gained 45 seats.²⁶

The change of the Hamas political direction that drove him to become a winner in the Palestinian political contestation at the time attracted the attention of the international community, especially the countries that do not want Hamas which is considered to obstruct the peace process. Even the United States considers Hamas victory in Palestinian politics as an accident and would hamper the peace process with Israel.²⁷ This victory also gives a large effect on the Palestinian foreign aid to Hamas movement, especially from western countries, because they do not want the Islamists have a major influence on international policy.²⁸

Besides getting rejection and criticism from outside, especially the allied countries of Israel, Hamas had to struggle with internal

²⁵ Khalid Hurub, *Hamas, al-Fikr wa al-Mumarasah*, (Beirut: Mu'assasah al-Dirasat al-Filistiniyah, 1999), 163.

²⁶ Read in Mariam Itani, *Sira' al-Sultat baina Fatah wa Hamas fi Idarat al-Sultah al-Filistiniyyah* (Beirut: Markaz al-Zaitunah li al-Dirasat wa al-Istisharat, 2008), 7-8.

²⁷ David Makovsky, "Israeli Policy and Politics in the Wake of Hamas's Victory", dalam Robert Satloff (ed.), *Hamas Triumphant: Implications for Security, Politics, Economy, and Strategy* (Washington: the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2006), 17-18.

²⁸ Jim Zanotti et.al, "Israel and Hamas: Conflic in Gaza (2008-2009)" dalam Nejc Kardelj (ed.), *Israel Versus Hamas*, 79.

²⁴ Fawaz A. Gerges, "ISIS and the Third Wafe of Jihadism" 340-341.

political constellation. As Mariam Itani said that the most complex problems facing the Palestinians in 2006, where election held, not how to success of the election but how to deal with the post-election conflict.²⁹ The conflict feared was actually happening, where factions who feel they have the authority to represent the Palestinian people, both in local and international sphere, has to compete with groups that are often labeled as radical and even terrorist groups, namely Hamas. Although the actual socio-political factors was provide benefits for Hamas because support for Fatah is decreased that caused by the inability to deliver good governance to the Palestinians.³⁰

Hamas considers that in order to build government institutions definitely need extensive support from the public. Thus Hamas using the slogan "*al-Islah wa al-tagayir*", and be a clear signal that the Palestinian government institutions requires of reform and change. For Hamas, waiting for state became worse and the people took to the streets to make a revolution is not the best way. Because certainly the people that will pay for the loss of a revolution. The best solution for the Palestinians is to stop government corruption through the mechanism of elections by opening the faucet freedom of speech to the people. It is Hamas political reform agenda that he feels capable to do it because it was have gained strong enough support from the Palestinian people.

Another important strategy used by Hamas is developing the military wing to confront Israel. For Hamas, the military approach and jihad is the most effective choice facing political conditions of Palestine. Military approach taken in the strategy of Hamas then made the Gaza Strip experienced a prolonged crisis. In the last

decade, there have been so many times of war between Hamas and Israel. In 2004, a series of war between Israel and Hamas, as its Israel claimed, rocket attacks of Hamas' military wing (Izzuddin al-Qassam Brigade) launched into its territory. In reaction to the attack, the leader of the IDF (Israel Defence Force) retaliated with air strikes and ground attacks. In the operation, between 104 and 133 Palestinians were killed, and five people on the Israeli side.³¹

In 2014, intense fighting between Israel and Hamas on a larger scale and more dangerous than ever in 2008-2009, on July 17 2014, Israeli troops entered the Gaza Strip, more than 2100 Palestinians were killed after intensify Israeli bombing of Gaza. The war ended after a 50-day conflict when a ceasefire was agreed on August 26, 2014. That is some great war in the Gaza Strip, although many also occur in small-scale wars over the past decade. In each end of the war the Hamas has always felt and celebrated victory despite the casualties of Gazans far more than that of the Israelis.³² If observed, Hamas's military strategy is more likely to be directed to the resistance against Israel as a form of patriotism to defend of his country.

2. ISIS: Total War

The Hamas view above contrasts with other Islamist groups such as al-Qaeda and ISIS who adopted a purely military strategy and outlawing practices such as democracy and electoral politics. In military issues, for example, ISIS is a group that does not hesitate to kill civilians, including women. Whereas, in Islamic law, there is no opinion differences among the jurists about Prohibition killing civilians, women and children in war, especially in a state of war. They also did not hesitate to kill

²⁹ Mariam Itani, *Sira' al-Sultat baina Fatah wa Hamas*, 9.

³⁰ Jamil Hilal, *al-Tandhimat wa al-Ahzab al-Siyasiyyah al-Filistiniyyah, baina Maham al-Dimuqratiyyah al-Dakhiliyyah wa al-Dimuqratiyyah al-Siyasiyyah wa al-Taharrur* (Ramallah: Muwatin, 2006), 52.

³¹ The chronology of the war could be accessed in al-Jazeera news, <http://studies.aljazeera.net/reports/2014/07/20147171111892808.htm>. Accessed 21 February 2015.

³² <http://www.aljazeera.net/news/reportsandinterviews/2014/7/20>. Access 21 February 2015.

prisoners from both Sunni and Shiite groups. For example, they killed one of the leaders of al-Nusrah brutally and spreading it through the video. This is clearly contrary to the teachings of the Prophet who forgives all prisoners in the battle of Badr, although they are (Quraysh) hostile and persecuting Muslims.³³

The Islamic State has short, medium and long term goals. Its short term goal is to consolidate the areas it already controls and capture more territory in Syria and Iraq. One of its central tactics it has used to advance its goals has been to precipitate all out sectarian war in Iraq between Sunnis and Shiites, which it tries to achieve by massacring civilian populations of Shiites whenever and wherever it can. This methodology is used partly due to their view of Shiites as heretics deserving of death and it is also a tactic aimed at causing reprisal attacks from Shiite militia groups, thus driving Sunnis into the arms of the Islamic State.³⁴

The Islamic State's medium term goal is to consolidate and expand its control of territory in Iraq and Syria and in the next stage to advance into neighboring Sunni countries. It seems that Saudi Arabia and Jordan will be the next targets. Both countries have large populations of discontented young men and both are authoritarian monarchies that emerged from the Arab Spring relatively unscathed. Advancing in this way is in keeping with the Islamic State's current practical approach of consolidating power in a contiguous territory in order to build a manageable and defensible state. Ultimately the group aims at nothing short of total world domination.³⁵

The tactics employed by The Islamic State are the tactics of insurgency, terrorism, and guerrilla warfare. Most of its core leadership,

many of whom are ex Ba'athists, have been involved in clandestine and violent opposition to the Iraqi state since 2003. Several were held at various times in US detention camps, and some escaped from Iraqi prisons during the Breaking the Walls campaign of the predecessor group, The Islamic State of Iraq, from July 2012 to July 2013. Their combined knowledge and experience have made The Islamic State 3 first and foremost a fighting force, but, at least in its main urban centers, the State has also attempted to consolidate its territorial gains by developing an administrative capacity. This has meant that as well as attracting fighters to its ranks, it has also set out to build a cadre of civilian technocrats. It is in this area that the long-term weaknesses of the State are most evident. Unless it can maintain existing public infrastructure and meet demands for food, water, health care, sanitation and energy, and build and sustain a functioning economy, it will not survive.³⁶

ISIS strategy that has been described appears to be very focused on the issue of strengthening the weapons and military training. Based on data on Islamist movements, this group has the the most powerful of weaponry and military capabilities. After the open support of the Arab world and the West against Syria, the group intensified military training and arming to winning competition with all other groups.³⁷ In addition, ISIS fortunate by obtain weapons from the Syrian army and Iraq since the joining of various groups within this group mainly from the former Iraqi and Syria army.

By the military strength, to the full confidence, ISIS embraced hostility strategies to the other groups. Shiites and Maliki government in Iraq as well as the Asad regime in Syria is the main enemy which being the target of war

³³ Najih Ibrahim and Hisyam al-Najjar, *al-Daulah al-Islamiyyah bi al-Iraq wa al-Syam: al-Sikkin allazi Tazbah al-Islam* (Kairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 2014), 61-62

³⁴ Elliot Friedland, "The Islamic State", 15.

³⁵ Elliot Friedland, "The Islamic State", 15.

³⁶ Richard Barrett, "The Islamic State", *the Soufan Group*, November 2014, 9.

³⁷ This problem discussed in Fadi Walid 'Akum, *Da'ish, al-Kita al-Aswad* (Kairo: Dar Amali li al-Nashr wa al-Tauzi, 2014). 47-50.

initiated by ISIS. Thus, groups like the Iraqi army, the Shiite troops in Iraq, the Syrian army, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Kurdish Workers' Party, and the the Syrian army liberation coming into enemies of ISIS.³⁸ In fact, in the latest development of this group they want to carry out an attack against soldiers of Hamas in the Gaza Strip.

It was reported in al-Arabiya News, ISIS group making trouble to the Hamas group in Palestine after ISIS-wing groups pledged to attack Hamas base in the Gaza Strip with the rockets on Friday, May 8, 2015. ISIS also previously been made Hamas upset after they attacked Palestinian refugee camp in Yarmouk, Syria. Some witnesses told AFP, saying that they heard explosions near Khan Yunis. However, there is no information about damage or casualties from the blast of the attack. "The group, which calls itself the supporters of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in Jerusalem, said in an online statement that fired rockets intended to the base occupied by Hamas's armed wing, al-Qassam Izzudin."³⁹

ISIS brutality was also always exhibited in social media. This tactic is included in their propaganda arm. The Islamic State is well known for releasing extremely gruesome videos of it carrying out mass and individual killings, such as those of American journalists James Foley and Stephen Sotloff and British aid worker David Haines. This tactic is replicated in their online strategy, tweeting out messages across several different platforms to ensure maximum visibility and utilizing social media effectively, such as the use of the hashtag (#AllEyesOnISIS) immediately following the capture of Mosul by the Islamic State's forces. This sophisticated messaging is an integral part of the Islamic

State's operations and is quite obvious in its glossy English magazine, Dabiq. The name of the magazine is taken from a location in Muslim eschatology, highlighting the Islamic State's millenarian appeal.⁴⁰

The ISIS strategy is certainly can not be separated from the influence of religious doctrinal. In a conflict theory proposed by Johan Galtung, conflict is an inherent part and acknowledged its existence in political and social life. In many places, the conflict was much influenced by ideological differences and religious sects and lead to a violent conflict. Conflicts that were born from religious sect competition could degrade the government and create chaos in the political and social life order. The consequences of the lack of the government's role to resolve such conflicts lead to the humanitarian crises in various places.⁴¹

Such conditions also occurred in Iraq and Syria. At the time of the establishment of ISIS, the Iraqi government dominated by Shiite groups that the regime of President Nur al-Maliki who came from Shi'ite Islam group was very repressive and discriminatory against Sunni Muslims. As it is known that the power of Shiites in Iraq today is the antithesis of the regime of Saddam Hussein which represents Sunnis and also repression against Shiites at the time of the ruling. This condition is exploited by al-Bagdadi to gain support from the Sunni community in order to realize its agenda that wants to establish an Islamic state of Iraq. Evidently, Bagdadi succeeded in recruiting thousands of militants from the Sunni Iraqi groups because it can trigger hostility towards the regime of Iraqi Shiites.

This phenomenon is in line with the views of Abdullah al-Baridi, that the outbreak of the

³⁸ Najih Ibrahim dan Hisyam al-Najjar, *al-Daulah al-Islamiyyah bi al-Iraq wa al-Syam: al-Sikkīn allazī Tazbah al-Islam*, 61.

³⁹ <http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2015/05/08/ISIS-supporters-claim-attack-on-Hamas-in-Gaza.html>. Accessed 10 July 2015.

⁴⁰ Elliot Friedland, "The Islamic State", *The Clarion Project: Challenging Extremism Promoting Dialogue*, (May 2015): 19.

⁴¹ Johan Galtung, *Theories of Conflict: Definitions, Dimensions, Negations and Formations*. Hawai: Hawai University Press, 1973.

conflict in the Middle East can not be separated from the doctrine of fundamentalism among Sunni and Shi'ite. What he means by Shi'ite Sunni fundamentalism is *al-tashaddud and al-tatarruf* (fanaticism and radicalism) into practice of their faith and tend to regard infidels of other groups. Many of Shi'ite religious leaders believe that the Sunnis should be fought because they were *najis* (gross). For example, a Shiite cleric named Muhammad Sadiq said, "People Wahhabi were unclean, even more odious than a dog".⁴² Nor vice versa, Sunni fundamentalist groups see the Shiite group extremely negative with regard them more dangerous than Jews and the state of Israel.⁴³

Concerning "Shia fundamentalism", many who reject this label mainly from the internal of Shia itself. The majority of Shia scholars reject the appearance of stigmatization that regarded mostly Shiite groups as "fundamentalist". One of the Shia leaders in Lebanon, Ahmad Sadiq, reject this naming models. He did not agree with attempts to reconcile Shias by Sunni fundamentalism that is synonymous with radical fundamentalists. Basically, the Shiite who do not agree with the stigmatization resisting the appearance of the assumption that there are also among Shiite radical groups or terrorists, as happened in the Sunni community. But in fact, the number of violent conflict involving Shiites be enough reason that part of the Shia community are also fundamentalist groups.⁴⁴

As a result of the extremes understanding in both Shi'ite and Sunni, the conflict in Palestine, especially between Hamas, Fatah and Israel does not separated from the influence of the Shiite Sunni sectarianism. Similarly with the conflict in Iraq, Syria and the conflict that is

ongoing today in Yemen shows the ideological and political rivalry between Sunni and Shiite.

D. Hamas and ISIS Influence Towards Global Conflict

There are two issues that need to be addressed in the discussion are: first, how the influence of Islamism (Hamas and ISIS) in a regional context (the Islamic world), secondly, how Hamas and ISIS potentially engaging the conflict with the United da West.

1. Hamas: Threats Against Arab Regimes and The West

In the Arab world, Hamas is basically considered a threat by the Arab regimes because they see Hamas as part of a conflict between Arab nationalism and Islamism. The new Middle East problem with the existence of Hamas as political factions in Palestine are they were no longer displayed as the Arab-Israeli conflict, but rather interpreted as a conflict between Arab nationalism with the Islamis groups. The fact shows that almost Arab countries (except Syria and ally Iran) and even the Palestinians themselves hoped that Hamas should boe defeated in the Gaza Strip. Because they have the same interest that is frustrated to interact with the revolution by Islamist groups, especially groups after outbreak of the Arab Spring. Arab countries are very worried about the emergence of extremist groups as well as when they were worried to the conflict (such as the Kuwait war in 1991, Palestine Revival from 2000 to 2004, and the Israel-Hezbollah war in 2006).⁴⁵

The above reason is quite rational because the current Middle East problems are very different from the past, especially from the aspect of domestic politics. Currently, the Arab country focused on the conflict between the

⁴² This fatwa mentioned in <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iqmIpJJjKrc>, diupload 17/10/2010.

⁴³ Abdullah al-Baridi, *al-Salafiyyah al-Syi'ah wa al-Sunnah* (Beirut: Al-Shabakah al-Arabiyyah li al-Abhath wa al-Nashr, 2013), 71-72.

⁴⁴ Abdullah al-Baridi, *al-Salafiyyah al-Syi'ah wa al-Sunnah*, 67-77.

⁴⁵ Khalid al-Hurub, *Hamas al-Fikr wa al-Mumarasah*, 174.

authorities and the Islamist opposition. That is, as an opposition group, Hamas is an ally of the enemies of the Arab regimes. With the emergence of an Islamic state in the Gaza Strip it will be a great inspiration for Islamists entities in Egypt, Jordan, and other Arab countries to establish the same Islamic state.⁴⁶

Second, the extreme attitude of Hamas is thought to be a major barrier to efforts to resolve permanently the Israeli-Palestinian problem. Confrontation and conflict between the Arabs and Israel actually makes Arab countries suffered a lot. Currently attempts to reconcile the two states of Israel and a Palestinian state become an international consensus. Among the Arab countries, Jordan, Egypt and Syria have had a peace agreement with Israel. Some of other Arab countries have also received the approach to coexistence with Israel. However, Hamas remains in an attitude of refusal to recognize the state of Israel which stimulates dissatisfaction of Arab countries who wished to see the coexistence of Israel and Palestine.⁴⁷ Therefore, in the regional perspective, Hamas is regarded as a threat to security and political stability, especially for Arab leaders.

While in the context of Islamism conflict with America and the West, initially, the United States and the West does not consider Hamas a terrorist organization. In March 1993 for example, the US State Forreign Affairs Department held a meeting with representatives of Hamas despite of Israel protest the meeting. Gradually, Americans realize that the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood is very strong within Hamas Movement so that they have to take careful to interact with the goup. The negative perceptions of the West against Hamas intensified when Hamas rejected the

Oslo accords. After that, various military actions carried out by the military wing of Hamas against Israel in the Gaza Strip has been criticized by the United States. Until the victory of Hamas in the elections in 2006, Hamas was treated as a danger and labeled as a hazardous terrorist group in the US media. The Israeli, the United States, Canada, Japan and the European Union then agreed to consider Hamas a terrorist group and became a threat to the stability of global life.⁴⁸

2. ISIS: Threats to The Global Security

Concerning the ISIS Islamism group, the question arises why the ISIS more easily able to recruit trans-national militants, and why this group became a major threat to the global security? Basically, ISIS success in recruiting his members from various countries can not be separated from the presence of radical Islamic groups in various places. Likened the plant, the seed is already there, so that when the seed was placed on arable land and stimulated by fertilizers and irrigation, then the seed will rapidly grow. When al-Bagdadi proclaimed the establishment of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, almost radical groups, especially al-Qaeda network, perform allegiance to ISIS. Radical groups such as Boko Haram in Negeria, Anshaar Bait al-Muqaddas in Gaza (Palestine) and Sinai (Egypt), al-Jama'ah al-Salafiyyah li al-Da'wah wa al-Qitaal in Algeria, al-Shabab in Somalia, and other radical groups in the world has made support for the establishment of the Islamic state by ISIS and ready to dispatch its members to Iraq and Syria.

Although ISIS is centered in Iraq and Syria and plenty perform its action in both places, but this group also threaten global security. It can be seen clearly when al-Adnani call for attacks against the coalition and regimes. The military ambition of the State remains the capture and

⁴⁶ Rubin, Barry. "The Real Enemy of Hamas", *Southern Metropolis News*, (2009: January 19): 11.

⁴⁷ Rajab Hasan al-'Aud al-Baba, *Juhud Harakah al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyyah (Hamas) fi al-Intifadah al-Filistiniyyah*, 251.

⁴⁸ Mulawarman Hannase, *Islamisme dan Konflik*, 233.

control of further territory in Iraq and Syria, and the consolidation of what it already has. In due course it may try to move into Jordan and Lebanon, where it already has supporters, and then into Saudi Arabia, but it does not seem to be making plans to do more. Unlike al Qaeda therefore, it does not appear to have set up camps within its territory to attract and train foreign recruits to commit terrorist acts elsewhere.

Although there have been several cells discovered abroad that have apparently been identifying and facilitating the travel of foreign fighters to join The Islamic State, which suggests an organized network of supporters, by late October 2014, no plot or attack had been identified outside the Levant that had been planned or directed from within the State, notwithstanding that some individuals with a connection to The Islamic State had been responsible for or involved in the planning or perpetration of terrorist acts elsewhere. The Islamic State has in any case already established a reputation for ruthless and indiscriminate violence, and it hardly need do more to turn the rest of the world against it. It is more in the administration of territory that its longevity will depend.⁴⁹ Among the terrorist act involving the ISIS network was events that happened in France, Morocco and Kuwait.⁵⁰

Similar thing manifested in Indonesia. Based on information from sources that writers get, when ISIS established, Jama'ah Islamiah (JI), Jama'at Ansar al-Tauhid (JAT) and other radical Islamic groups that exist in this country come to pledge allegiance to ISIS and willing to go to Iraq and Syria in order to strive to establish an Islamic state. Since then, the members of these

radical groups have managed to go to Iraq and Syria. To reach the two countries, the mode used is to first make a visit to the countries bordering Iraq and Syria. After that, they go into these countries by land with intense communication with ISIS groups in both countries.⁵¹

In Indonesian context, it is not easy to prevent the spread of the ideology of ISIS and its recruitment because today we are in a very open life networking. The openness of social media and easy access to international travel makes the government difficult to oversee the development of this network. The proliferation of social media such as Facebook, Twitter and WhatsApp and the large of international travel agency make the government must work hard to keep an eye on the movement of the ISIS network.

Thus, the most appropriate step to counteract the ISIS network is to strengthen the process of de-radicalization. It must be recognized that in the absence of the existence of radical groups in Indonesia or in other countries as already mentioned, then we do not need to be worrying about recruitment of ISIS in Indonesia. Evidently, they were identified joined the ISIS were member of the network of radical groups, both from a network of Solo, Poso and others. Therefore, all components of the state, government, Islamic organizations and the general public should cooperate to supervise institutions indicated teach radical ideologies. Because when the radical ideologies flourished ISIS then will be easily accepted, and the potential actions of terror threat the social, economical and political stability of Indonesia and all over the world.

Conclusion

To deal with the Hamas and ISIS movement it should be concluded in three points:

⁴⁹ Richard Barrett, "The Islamic State", *the Soufan Group*, November 2014, 39.

⁵⁰ In attacks to three continents, ISIS argued to be responsible on that's. See al-Arabiya News "Terror attacks on 3 continents; ISIS claims responsibility in Tunisia, Kuwait" <http://edition.cnn.com/2015/06/26/africa/tunisia-terror-attack/>. Accessed 5 July 2015.

⁵¹ Presentation of Director of Deradicalisation Affairs (BNPT) in the Seminar about ISIS in Indonesia, Jakarta City Hall, June 2015.

First, although two movements have the same ideological roots, in its development, the thought of the two groups have many differences. Hamas which adopts the ideology of the Brotherhood does not mislead other Islamist groups with different views. While ISIS which adopted the doctrine of al-Qaeda embraced "takfir", that blame all those that refuse to pledge allegiance and join the group to establish an Islamic state. In this context, the idea of Hamas is more moderate than ISIS which is considered by researchers as an ultra-radical group.

Second, from the aspect of movement and the struggle strategy, Hamas and ISIS also have significant differences caused by differences of ideology. In the latest development of the Hamas strategy the group has in fact accepted the concept of democracy and engaged in practical politics. The socio-political life of Hamas is very open and easily interacted with the various parties including countries and other Islamic groups. In contrast to the strategy of the ISIS movement, a group that is misleading secular government, democracy and nationalism continues to fight against the regime in Iraq and Syria, and Islamic groups and other minorities. Even Hamas also considered as deviant groups and a traitor by ISIS for refusing to join him to establish an Islamic state.

Third, from the aspect of public perception and its influence on global conflict, Hamas and ISIS also have many differences. In the context of the Middle East, Hamas Institution acceptable by some Arab countries and Islamic countries, despite the ruling regimes actually did not expect Hamas became stronger group. The reason is, as the Islamist group Hamas is part of the opposition who take the fight against Arab rulers especially after the outbreak of the Arab Spring. As for the majority of Western countries, including the United States and Europe still considers Hamas as a banned group

since fundamentalist ideology adopted and military resistance carried out against Israel. However, from the aspect of global conflict, Hamas is not a dangerous threat.

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